Arbitration – Court powers to stay litigation because of arbitration agreements by Adams, J. E.
Arbitration
Court powers to stay litigation because of arbitration agreements
by Professor J E Adams
Prior to 31 January 1997, court 
powers to stay litigation because of an 
agreement to arbitrate a dispute derived 
from the Arbitration Act 1950, s. 4 or the 
Arbitration Act 1975, s. 1. The lormer 
related to domestic contracts (as defined) 
and was discretionary; the latter related 
to non-domestic and was mandatory. The 
earlier statute prescribed no grounds for 
grant of a stay, although case law had 
shown the likely factors, but s. 1 of the 
1975 Act laid down the restricted 
grounds that:
'the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed or 
... there is not in fact any dispute between the 
parties with regard to the matter agreed to be 
referred.'
A common situation could arise wrhere 
one party to a contract sought to claim a 
sum from the other and, despite an 
arbitration clause in the agreement, 
issued proceedings and sought summary 
judgment, under O. 14 of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court (RSC, O. 14), on the basis 
that no defence to the claim could be 
raised. The O. 14 summons and the 
defendant's summons to stay the 
proceedings would be heard together. If a 
prima facie defence was established, a 
stay was likely; if not, there was no 
obstacle in s. 4 (1950) or s. 1 (1975) to 
an immediate order for summary 
judgment. If judgment were given for 
only part of the claim, a stay could be 
granted for the balance. This procedure 
was frequently used in construction 
disputes.
NEW LEGISLATION
When, after some three years 
gestation, the Arbitration Act 1996 came 
into force on 3 1 January 1997, s. 4 of the 
1950 Act was effectively reproduced in 
s. 86 and s. 1 of the 1975 Act in s. 9. 
This \vas meant to preserve the 
domestic/ non-domestic distinction; the 
discretionary/mandatory differentiation 
continued. However a challenge under 
the Treaty of Rome to the acceptability of 
distinguishing domestic agreements in 
the Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 
1988 had succeeded in the Court of
Appeal in Phillip Alexander Securities and 
Futures Ltd v Bamberger (Times Law 
Reports, 22 July 1996) on the basis of 
wrongtullv discriminating against EC
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litigants. As a consequence, s. 86 was not 
brought into force with the rest of the 
1996 Act; it now seems likely that it 
never will be. So s. 9 now governs the 
whole range.
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The first three 1975 grounds for 
refusing a stay   that the reference to 
arbitration is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed   still 
appear in the section. The phrases are 
taken verbatim from the New York 
Convention 1958 (the UK's accession to it 
being the reason for the passing ol the 
1975 Act). The final provision of the old 
s. 1 ('... there is not in fact any dispute 
etc.') was not carried into the new s. 9. 
The Report of the Departmental 
Advisory Committee (DAC), the 
'sponsor' ol the bill, pointed out that the 
provision was not in the Convention and 
moreover, was 'confusing and 
unnecessary.' This was said to be so for 
the reasons given in Hayter v Nelson 
[1990] 2 Ll Rep 265 but no more 
indication of what lay behind the 
omission was given, although the
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reference to the elements discussed in 
the 1990 case is briefly expanded in the 
discussion ot s. 86. A later 
Supplementary Report, just before the 
Act came into force, made no further 
reference to the issue.
GROWING CONCERNS
In the period since the act took effect, 
mounting dissatisfaction has emerged.
O O
Practitioners do not share the optimism 
of the DAC that:
'if in truth there is no defence to the claim, 
then it should not take more than a very short 
time for an arbitral tribunal to deal with the 
matter and produce an award.'
The very steps of initiating an 
arbitration, appointing a tribunal, 
appraising it of the dispute and proving 
the absence of any defence involve time 
and extra expense   both absent from the 
lormer practice of issuing proceedings 
followed by the O. 14 procedure, given
that the reluctant party has to participate 
in the arbitral process, and has every 
incentive to be obstructive or at least 
dilatory. On a more fundamental level, 
the willingness of arbitrators to give
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summary relief remains untested and is a 
good example of the new attitudes 
required by the new act.
ARBITRATION HAZARDS
The very steps ot initiating an arbitration, 
appointing a tribunal, appraising it of the 
dispute and proving the absence ot any 
defence involve time and extra expense.
More specific problems affect 
construction disputes. Following the lead 
in major construction contracts, there is 
increasing provision for interim 
adjudication processes to provide 
provisional resolution of disputes, 
followed by formal arbitration at a later 
stage, sometimes only following final 
completion of the project. The Housing 
Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996 will make adjudication compulsory 
in many construction contracts. Under 
s. 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996, initial 
proceedings will be stayed to permit the 
possibility of arbitration. There are 
possible counter-arguments, suggesting 
methods of enforcing an adjudicator's 
award which by-pass s. 9 (or more 
accurately, the express invocation of s. 9 
  for it is not self-activating) but none is 
obviously conclusive or even convincing.
The Arbitration Act 1996 has certainly 
not outworn its initial welcome, but the 
family squabble during the honeymoon 
period has not settled. The unfortunate 
'mismatch' of the two acts and its 
incompatibility' with the practical needs 
of the construction industry surely 
deserve urgent attention. ©
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